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A la recherche du “sens” perdu: 
Copyrightable Creativity 
Deconstructed 
 
Thomas M. Byron* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
As the functional capabilities of computing systems 
continue to grow and mature, computers are no longer just 
replacing human labor.  They are also infiltrating areas 
traditionally considered the province of human judgment.  By 
way of an example of this phenomenon, two researchers at 
Rutgers University have recently designed computer software 
that can analyze works of art and rank them based on their 
creativity.1  Their software works by leveraging image 
processing technology to analyze digital images of paintings.2  It 
then applies a fixed algorithm to the input images that 
determines the depicted painting’s creativity based on two 
factors, the work’s novelty and historical influence.3  The values 
assigned to the novelty and influence variables are generated 
within the software through a chronological analysis of the 
 
* J.D., Emory University School of Law, M.A., Boston University, B.A., 
Dartmouth College.  The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful feedback of 
Christopher Buccafusco, Dan Burk, and Roberta Kwall on an earlier 
presentation of this Article.  The author currently serves as Corporate Counsel 
for the MathWorks, Inc. while pursuing a Ph.D. in French Literature at Boston 
University.  The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone, and do not 
reflect those of MathWorks or B.U. 
1. Dominic Basulto, Why it matters that computers are now able to judge 
human creativity, WASH. POST (June 18, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2015/06/18/why-it-
matters-that-computers-are-now-able-to-judge-human-creativity/.  See also 
Ahmed Elgammal and Babak Saleh, Quantifying Creativity in Art Networks, 
PROC. OF THE SIXTH INT’L CONF. ON COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY 39-47 (2015). 
2. Id. at 39.  The researchers claim that the software could also analyze 
sculpture, literature, and other fields; but their initial work covered only 
painting.  Id. at 46. 
3. Id. at 40. 
1
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totality of paintings input to the system.  Essentially, the 
software analyzes each painting in the context of its historical 
moment—say, Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, completed as late 
as 1517—by way of comparison with other paintings that 
preceded and succeeded it—perhaps Titian’s Allegory of 
Prudence completed between 1565 and 1575.4  Paintings unlike 
their predecessors, but which sparked substantial similarity in 
successors, were deemed most creative.5  The obverse case, 
where a painting parroted an earlier work without generating 
later mimicry, led to the opposite result, a finding of lesser 
creativity.6  The software’s initial iteration spanned over 62,000 
works of art created over a period of roughly 600 years, from 
1400 AD to the present.7  The winners in this creativity pageant? 
Leonardo’s work (perhaps unsurprisingly) received high marks 
when measured against his Renaissance peers.8  Van Gogh 
produced some favorably analyzed work in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, while Mondrian’s geometric vision seems to 
have carried the first half of the twentieth.9  Finally, recent 
works by Fernando Calhau and Piero Dorazio are the standard 
bearers for modern art.10 
This software’s advent has to come as something of a relief 
to the art community.  No longer will art historians need to 
debate the artistic and creative merits of various paintings. 
Software like that described above will provide them with a clear 
and simple answer.  No longer will impassioned arguments 
between art students drown out the rhythm of chairs placed on 
tables in cafés closing in Rome’s Monti and Paris’ Rive gauche.  
Such students will have at their fingertips an electronic ranking 
as readymade as the Marcel Duchamp fountain whose virtues 
they extol.11  No longer will a painter new to the field need to 
question the creativity of her first work.  It will be susceptible to 
 
4. Id. at 41. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See Basulto, supra note 1. 
8. See Elgammal & Saleh, supra note 1, at 46. 
9. Id. at 45. 
10. Id. at 46. 
11. For more on Duchamp, see READYMADES OF MARCEL DUCHAMP, 
http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Readymades-of-
Marcel-Duchamp.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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a clear classification, if not upon its immediate creation, then at 
least after the passage of time grants context to the work’s 
historical influence.  And no longer will the present day require 
its own version of works of historical fiction like Emile Zola’s 
L’Œuvre12 or the Goncourts’ Manette Salomon.13  Modern 
software will obviate the need for a refreshed take on these 
novels, whose fictional painters Claude Lantier and Coriolis are 
relegated to ignored, but highly creative, struggle while the art 
establishment crowns their less creative confrères. 
The creativity-ranking software stands to have an 
additional, less likely beneficiary—the legal community in the 
form of copyright scholars and judges applying copyright law.  
This is because the latter body of law relies on creativity in 
certain critical respects.  At a general level, copyright’s 
fundamental charge is the promotion of creativity14 - a charge 
indirectly captured in copyright law’s Constitutional foundation, 
which empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”15  The Science mentioned in the clause is often 
associated with copyright protection16 and accordingly serves 
the end of creativity in myriad protected forms, from painting 
and sculpture to maps and books.  Beyond the overarching 
creativity inherent in copyright’s purpose, creativity rears its 
head more specifically in a number of sub-doctrinal areas of 
 
12. See generally EMILE ZOLA, L’ŒUVRE (Elek Books Ltd. 1886). 
13. See generally EDMOND & JULES DE GONCOURT, MANETTE SALOMON 
(Eugène Fasquelle ed., Bibliothèque- Charpentier 1897). 
14. This premise is highlighted ubiquitously in judicial opinions and 
copyright scholarship, but for a couple of examples, see Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting the Copyright 
Clause “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors 
by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the 
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired.”).  William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: 
Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 690, n.104 
(1992). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
16. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012) (including only “Science,” 
and not “useful Arts,” when citing the Copyright Clause).  This is in 
contradistinction to the mention of “useful Arts” in the same Constitutional 
provision, which is regularly interpreted to refer to Congress’ ability to enact 
patent legislation.  See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1965) 
(mentioning only the “useful Arts” portion of the clause when discussing patent 
protection). 
3
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copyright.17  When assessing whether a derivative work is 
sufficiently original to merit its own copyright protection, 
copyright law relies on a variety of creativity standards.  An oft-
cited example of one such creativity analysis occurred in L. 
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,18 a case involving a recreation of a 
public domain Uncle Sam piggy bank.  There, the Second Circuit 
found that the recreation in question did not sufficiently build 
on the original to merit copyright protection because the later 
work did not evince “substantial originality”19 vis-à-vis its public 
domain predecessor.20  Other circuits have adopted their own 
standards when determining whether a derivative work 
embodies sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection.  
These standards may be mapped on a scale, where bookending 
the substantial creativity required by the Batlin case are 
minimal creativity and gross creativity standards.21 
In a subset more relevant to the analysis proposed here, 
copyright law also relies on assessments of creativity when 
asking the threshold question of whether a specific work is 
copyrightable at all.  This requirement follows from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co.,22 which declined to find infringement where a 
telephone company had copied another company’s white pages 
telephone directory.23  The Court based its decision not on the 
extent of copying by the former company—it was clear that the 
copying had been wholesale in nature24—but on the lack of 
 
17. In addition to those areas discussed here, Professor Gregory Mandel 
has noted creativity’s importance to determinations of joint authorship.  Such 
determinations often turn on a stereotypical view of creativity, depending on 
whether they are made in patent or copyright contexts.  See generally Gregory 
N. Mandel, Left-Brain versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of 
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (2010). 
18. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976). 
19. Id. at 491. 
20. Id. at 492. 
21. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse 
or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 6 (2001) (observing these three 
standards of creativity). 
22. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
23. Id. at 342-44, 363. 
24. Id. at 344.  The copying was so substantial as to reach fictional names 
included by the original white page compiler. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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copyrightability of the original white pages.25  For lack of 
copyright protection, then, the original telephone directory 
compiler could not show infringement.  The Court supported this 
finding by inaugurating a new standard of originality required 
of a work to obtain copyright protection.  Where works 
traditionally only had to be original to their authors in the sense 
of having been created by their authors without copying another 
work,26 the Feist decision added a second Constitutionally-
mandated27 requirement—that a work also evidence a “modicum 
of creativity”28 to qualify for copyright protection.  Because the 
white pages at issue in Feist were deemed “garden-variety” and 
“devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity,”29 they did not 
satisfy this new requirement. 
In either the context of derivative works or Feist’s 
originality standard, software like that designed by the Rutgers 
researchers might benefit both courts and copyright scholars.  
Certain updates to the software would be necessary, however.  
First, the software would have to be expanded to include piggy 
banks, telephone directories, and any other object whose 
creativity was at issue in a given litigation.  Each class of goods 
might require its own iteration of the software—with the 
creativity of piggy banks being compared to other piggy banks, 
the creativity of phone directories being compared to other phone 
directories, and so on.  While litigants might hypothetically 
argue over the proper set of works to be included in a specific 
class, the authors of the creativity software do contemplate 
expansion to other fields beyond painting.30  Once the spectrum 
for creativity is mapped for a given class of works, all that would 
remain for a court to make a determination on creativity would 
be to assign threshold values corresponding to each standard at 
different points on the spectrum.  A certain point would map to 
a “modicum of creativity” for the Feist originality standard, and 
other points would track to the three different creativity 
 
25. Id. at 362. 
26. See, e.g., Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and 
Cogitation: A Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard in Copyright Law, 
82 DENV. U. L. REV. 259, 260 (2004) [hereinafter Random Numbers]. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. See Elgammal & Saleh, supra note 1, at 39. 
5
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standards applied in derivative works cases.  The thorny, 
qualitative, and subjective question of creativity would thereby 
be reduced to a predictable, quantitative, and objective analysis 
in the hands of courts. 
If only it were so simple.  Beyond the methodological issues 
just barely addressed regarding the application of software to 
questions of copyrightable creativity, there looms a far more 
monolithic issue.  How can software meaningfully compute 
creativity?  The short answer to this—and the authors of the 
creativity software acknowledge as much—is “it cannot, at least 
not with any complete precision.”  The authors of the creativity 
software note in particular that their chosen analysis was 
limited by a few critical factors.  Because creativity is 
determined within the software on the basis of only the set of 
images scanned, the software’s results are only as good as the 
richness of its database.31  A greater number of paintings 
scanned might have changed the program’s output by 
potentially catching new pioneers earlier in time and 
condemning the previously vaunted to the status of less-creative 
laggards.  Further, the program can only analyze “what it sees,” 
that is, the images fed to it through a scanning process and 
subject to “underlying computer vision methods.”32  It does not 
appreciate the rich texture of a Jackson Pollack.  Finally, the 
software is entirely dependent on the algorithm that it 
implements.33  If that algorithm were changed to reflect a 
different weighting of the novelty versus influence factors, its 
output results would shift, as well.  If the algorithm reflected an 
entirely different definition of creativity—one which did not 
value influence, for example—then the results would change in 
still other ways.  This complication flows from a more 
fundamental concern—by reducing creativity to so many specks 
on a numerically-bound scatterplot, the creativity software 
provides a single, supposedly objective answer to a question that 
is almost hopelessly subjective.  “Creativity” is a term of 
inherent fluidity, whose meaning might legitimately vary as 
between art scholars, art students, painters, judges, and 
laypeople at a given historical moment, and as between aesthetic 
 
31. See Elgammal & Saleh, supra note 1, at 39. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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notions accepted at different historical moments.  What 
dominant thought in the Renaissance deemed “creative” might 
look very different from that same notion as conceived now.  
Upon closer investigation, then, what a computer posits as an 
objective measure of creativity is no more than a single 
subjective iteration bound by algorithm among potentially 
infinite others that algorithms or human beings might espouse. 
These issues do not just plague the search for creativity by 
computers.  In many similar ways, they contaminate the 
creativity analyses currently used by courts.  For now, let us 
hypothetically consider a court standing in the place of the 
computer program discussed here.  At least at a superficial level, 
the comparison has its points of resonance.  Just as the computer 
software cannot expand beyond the set of images made available 
through scanning, so, too, must a court limit itself to the 
evidence that is properly brought before it in litigation.34  A court 
theoretically can no more speculate on what lies outside the 
realm of admitted evidence than can a computer speculate on 
images outside the realm of its database.  Further, if a computer 
can only apply the methods that it technologically embodies, a 
court can only apply its own set of methodologies to the case at 
hand.  For purposes of the analogy here, the vision technology 
limits that bound computational analysis become limits on 
evidence and procedure when transplanted to a courtroom.  
Finally, and by way of the ultimate methodological limit, the 
court, like the computer, can only apply the definition of 
creativity dictated by previous decisions. Here, the 
programmer’s chosen definition, reliant on novelty and 
influence, becomes the articulation of creativity espoused in 
precedent by a given circuit court. 
Admittedly, this comparison takes a highly mechanistic 
view of courts.  Courts are, of course, free to exercise a higher 
degree of discretion in many cases where a computer program 
running a simple algorithm cannot.  Where the latter’s input 
 
34. An appellate review often considers a district court’s decision “in light 
of all the evidence” before the district court.  Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. 
Co., 613 F.2d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1980).  To require that evidence be brought 
before the court is a simplification, however.  Courts can take judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts beyond those brought directly into evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 
201. 
7
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entirely determines its output (presuming no unforeseen error, 
defect, system failure, or bug), the former is tasked with making 
an argument that might dynamically highlight certain aspects 
of a given case’s facts or law to reach a decision in contradiction 
with another court’s hypothetical application of the same law to 
the same facts.  That said, the almost Cartesian35 view of courts 
proposed as a possibility here may be viewed as a hypothetical 
comparison between the behavior of courts and computers.  It is 
one task of this Article to see if that hypothesis gains any 
support in the practical legal world.  This question is approached 
not with an eye towards evidentiary or procedural practice, but 
through the primary legal definition of creativity and its 
constraints on a court’s methodology. 
A review of judicial decisions is only the secondary goal of 
this Article, however.  The primary, but related, goal is to show 
how the concept of “creativity” as defined and applied by courts 
in copyright cases fails to map any reasonable concept of 
creativity in certain critical respects.  Accordingly, the first 
charge undertaken here is a deconstructive one—to show the 
lack of meaningful overlap between the legal definition of 
creativity and the “actual” meanings of that same term.  To 
undertake this comparison, Part II of this Article focuses on 
perhaps the more easily determined of these two definitions of 
the term—“creativity” as defined by courts.  Rather than giving 
an unduly broad berth to this analysis, however, the Article will 
limit its review to creativity as applied in the context of Feist-
based threshold creativity reviews.  As a matter of further 
distillation, such cases will be highlighted where courts rely on 
an alternatives-based test to find creativity.  This very 
commonly-applied test dictates that a creator’s work is creative 
under copyright if she enjoyed sufficient alternative means of 
communicating the idea underlying her work.  Part III of the 
Article will show how the alternatives-based conception of 
creativity—while perhaps well-meaning and successful in 
 
35. To view a court’s function as mechanistically as here is to associate 
that function with the method proposed by Descartes in books like his 
MÉDITATIONS and DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE.  See RENÈ DESCARTES, 
MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (John Cottingham ed. & trans., Cambridge 
University Press 1996) (1641); see RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD 
(Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 3d ed. 1998) (1637). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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promoting unrelated policy objectives—is ill-suited to measure 
the presence of actual creativity.  This limited fit is 
demonstrated, in part, via a Proustian hypothetical that reveals 
inconsistent results between creativity according to courts and 
creativity in literary practice.  Part III also attempts to prove 
such inconsistencies by drawing on scholarly legal literature on 
the topic of creativity.  Having completed a deconstruction of the 
legal notion of “creativity,” part IV of this Article concludes on a 
more constructive, if not wholly restructuring, note by invoking 
a separate model of creativity that would seem to improve on the 
views of courts and computers—a model indirectly proposed by 
the Nobel laureate Bergson in his work The Creative Evolution, 
among others.36  Although the Bergsonian model may not be 
limited to rigid categorization, it focuses on creativity as a 
function of indeterminacy in the creative process and its 
embodied result.  It is through just such a model that a more 
accurate, if more fluid, view of the term “creativity” may be 
conceived, in both general and copyrightable meanings of the 
word. 
Over the course of the three parts that follow, then, this 
Article will trace the form of the first period of sine curve.  It 
begins here at an origin, a zero-point with no preconceived 
notion of creativity.  Part II builds from this point of origin by 
constructing positively, ultimately reaching a peak by way of a 
mature judicial conception of the term “creativity.”  Part III 
serves to undermine, deconstruct, and perhaps even raze Part 
II’s judicially constructed edifice.  It is thus the sine curve’s arc 
falls below the imaginary x-axis to reach its nadir.  Part IV 
resurrects the curve with a proposed construction of creativity 
that restores the system to something of an original point with 
 
36. One might question why creativity should be read through the lens of 
Bergson.  Professor Roberta Kwall indirectly answers this question in The 
Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process Theology.  Roberta R. Kwall, 
The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process Theology, 14 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 889 (2012) [hereinafter Living Gardens].  There, she specifically 
highlights the propriety of a creativity analysis undertaken from the 
perspective of Process Thought.  Id.  She comments that “the parallel [with 
Process Thought] for human creativity is quite clear. Most human creators 
experience the same type of ongoing evaluative process, resulting in works that 
evolve and progress.”  Id. at 900.   As we shall see, the philosophy of Bergson 
aligns fairly closely with the field of Process Thought, and accordingly 
represents a valuable source for understanding creativity, as well. 
9
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further growth envisaged.  From there, the reader is left to 
imagine additional cycles of growth and decay passing to the 
infinite.  It may be that through just such sinusoidal cycles of 
varying amplitudes and frequencies, creativity in its non-legal 
sense pulsates and flows, grows and shrinks, and bursts and 
rests.   
 
II. Creativity as Defined by Courts Applying Feist 
 
The Feist Court’s mandate that works evidence a “modicum 
of creativity” to merit copyright protection provided lower courts 
with an immediate challenge.  This challenge arose from a 
curious combination of two factors in the case.  On one hand, the 
Supreme Court inaugurated a new creativity standard.37  On the 
other, the Court denied that the artifact before it, the telephone 
directory, possessed such creativity.38  This mismatch between 
the Court’s new rule and its holding could be viewed as reducing 
the vast majority of the Feist decision to the status of dictum.39  
Clearly falling in this legally non-binding category are those 
portions of the decision opining what constitutes sufficient 
creativity.  The work at issue did not possess such creativity due 
to its “garden variety”40 nature; a work exceeding the new 
standard was not before the Court such that the Court could 
establish what aspects would enable the purely “garden variety” 
to transition to the protectably creative.  The problem then shifts 
to a question of proof by negation—unless a given set not 
meeting a criterion represents the whole set not meeting such a 
criterion, the meaning of the affirmative rule cannot be inferred.  
In other words, unless the telephone directory (and perhaps 
others like it) represent the outer bounds of the “uncreative,” one 
cannot deduce what is creative.  Clearly, the Court did not 
intend to limit its new rule to telephone directories; otherwise, 
it would have denied copyright protection on the narrower 
ground that the work at issue was an uncreative telephone 
directory, not an uncreative work more generally.  So a certain 
 
37. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). 
38. Id. at 362. 
39. Dennis Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 
169 (2008). 
40. Feist Publ’n, Inc., 499 U.S. at 362. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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space necessarily remains between the object determined 
insufficiently creative—an iteration of traditionally standard 
white pages—and the class of goods that are sufficiently 
creative.  What other objects that are at once insufficiently 
creative and “not a white pages” accordingly remained 
completely unclear after Feist.  
Even if one is willing to afford some value to the non-binding 
language in Feist, the decision still does not get very far in 
advancing an affirmative definition of creativity.  At one point, 
the Court explains that “the requisite level of creativity is 
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.  The vast 
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess 
some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it 
might be.”41  This language is plainly not a definition of the term 
“creativity.”  Instead, it is a statement unhelpfully establishing 
a threshold level in the as-yet undefined term.  Seen from this 
perspective, this particular pronouncement would have lost no 
effect if it had been articulated using any other concept.  The 
requisite level of “anarcho-syndicalist communism”42 would 
have served just as well, if that term remained equally 
undefined.  Through the first sentence of this quotation, the 
Court has provided a number without a yardstick.  The second 
sentence, far from providing such a yardstick, muddies efforts at 
a possible definition.  Reassurances that most works (none of 
which were before the Court, of course) would satisfy the 
undefined creativity standard merely restates the first 
sentence’s problem, but the addition of the words “crude, 
humble, or obvious” provide some rough substance by which 
creativity might be defined as a fairly low bar.  Yet the Court 
also uses the term “creative spark,” which would seem to conjure 
grander images of potentially Promethean creativity.  So even 
where the Court begins to give a somewhat wispy form to the 
creativity requirement, it does so equivocally, in arguable self-
contradiction. And as commentators have further noted, the 
Court provides no guidance elsewhere in the decision as to what 
a “creative spark” might mean.43  It is fair to view the case as the 
 
41. Id. at 345. 
42. See MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Michael White Productions 
1975) for a use of a form of this term. 
43. Clifford, supra note 26, at 268. 
11
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implementation of a new standard without a “workable 
definition” of what that standard might be.44 
This has left lower courts with a certain degree of freedom 
to interpret the Feist creativity standard in different ways; and 
the results have been, perhaps unsurprisingly, divergent.  To 
demonstrate this divergence, further background is necessary.  
Let us begin prior to the Feist decision, with a bedrock principle 
of copyright that serves as a mediating term in later creativity 
analyses.  This principle is the “idea-expression dichotomy,” 
which dictates, in its simplest terms, that ideas remain 
uncopyrightable while the expression of those ideas may be 
susceptible to copyright protection.45  For example, the “idea” of 
sculpture of a deer is not protectable, but a particular sculptor’s 
iteration of this would be.46  This summary of the idea-
expression dichotomy is deceptively simple, and a good bit more 
texture is necessary to explain the doctrine’s subtleties.  Perhaps 
the most typically cited description of the dichotomy comes from 
Learned Hand in the case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 
Corp.,47 a case involving a play by the plaintiff entitled “Abie’s 
Irish Rose,” alleged to have been infringed by a later motion 
picture “The Cohens and the Kellys.”48  Because the case did not 
involve the literal taking of any dialogue of the original work, 
the court was compelled to consider the similarities of the works 
at an abstract level.  This it did according to the following 
general idea/expression framework: 
 
[U]pon any work . . ., a great number of patterns 
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as 
more and more of the incident is left out. The last 
 
44. Id. at 279-80.  See also Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 801, 822 (1993) (“What the Court failed to do in Feist was 
explain just how it determined that Rural's white pages lacked the creativity 
requisite to elevate it to ‘original’ status for purposes of copyright.”). 
45. This principle is codified within the Copyright Act, which states that 
“[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend 
to any idea…” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
46. Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 
Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Several sculptors may copy a deer, even 
the same deer, in creating a sculpture, and each may obtain copyright 
protection for his or her own expression of the original."). 
47. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
48. Id. at 120. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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may perhaps be no more than the most general 
statement of what the play is about, and at times 
might consist only of its title; but there is a point 
in this series of abstractions where they are no 
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright 
would prevent use of his ‘ideas’ to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never 
extended.49 
 
Because the two dramatic works at issue only overlapped to 
the extent that they were comedies based upon both a quarrel 
between ethnically diverse families and the love that two of the 
families’ children develop despite the quarrel, the elements 
allegedly taken fell on the unprotected “idea” side of Hand’s 
framework.50  As such, no infringement was found. 
At first glance, this test is of fairly limited value.  It basically 
says that there are things called “ideas,” to which copyright 
protection does not extend, that are more general or abstract 
versions of a given work.  And then there is a separate class of 
things called “expression,” which may be protected, that are 
more concrete in nature.  Somewhere between these two ends of 
a spectrum from general to specific, protection begins to vest, 
although that point is not clear.51 
It is at this point of limited clarity that one iteration of the 
idea/expression dichotomy, called the merger doctrine, might 
meaningfully guide discussion.  The merger doctrine refers to 
the possibility that idea and expression might merge in a single 
work, such that they become effectively indistinguishable.  In 
such a case, the unprotectability of an idea trumps the 
protectability of expression.  For example, in Veeck v. S. Bldg. 
Code Congress Int’l,52 the appellee developed model fire and gas 
codes for buildings, which the appellant copied to his web site.53  
Between the creation and subsequent copying of the model 
codes, however, certain towns in north Texas adopted the codes 
 
49. Id. at 121. 
50. Id. at 122. 
51. “Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”  
Id. at 121. 
52. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002). 
53. Id. at 793. 
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as their own law.54  Because the appellant who copied the codes 
presented them as the law of the Texas towns on his web site, 
the court found that the appellant was copying no more than law 
not properly subject to copyright. Once the model business codes 
were adopted, in other words, they merged with the law of the 
towns in question.55  If someone—including the appellant—
wished to cite to that law, that person needed access to the exact 
expression embodied in the law.56  So what began as creative 
expression by the appellee fundamentally changed in character 
when it became law, for the idea of a north Texas building code 
merges with the expression of that code. 
Underpinning this finding is a Lockean policy objective.  The 
protectability of expression must yield to the unprotectability of 
idea when the two merge because to find otherwise would 
deprive the public domain of necessary expressive tools.  As the 
Veeck court noted, the appellant web site operator “could not 
express the enacted law in any other way.”57  What matters in 
the merger inquiry are the number of expressive alternatives 
available to articulate a given idea.  In Veeck, there were no such 
alternatives to cite to a legal document.  In other cases, a paucity 
of expressive alternatives has served to deny protection to a map 
of a fixed pipeline route,58 scented candle labels depicting the 
fruits and flowers whose odors were captured in the candle 
scents,59 and a set of basic box top instructions,60 among others.  
To allow copyright in works amenable to so few expressive 
alternatives would mean that subsequent cartographers, candle 
makers, and box top designers could not express basic ideas 
necessary to their trade without infringing another’s copyright.  
This violates the basic Lockean principle where property rights 
are acceptable as long as alternatives to the property are 
“enough, and as good.”61  Merger cases present a scenario where 
 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 802. 
56. Id. at 801. 
57. Id. at 802. 
58. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th 
Cir. 1990). 
59. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
60. Morrisey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). 
61. Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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there are neither enough ways to express an idea, nor other ways 
that are as good. 
This same Lockean reasoning leads to a contrary result in 
copyright cases where an idea admits of sufficient expressive 
alternatives.  The recent copyright dispute pitting technology 
giants Google and Oracle offers one example of this.62  The case 
concerned Google’s unlicensed implementation of Oracle’s Java 
programming language in Android phones.63  Google adopted an 
argument not very different from the appellant in Veeck, where 
Google’s purported need to use Java replaced the Veeck 
appellant’s need to use the building code.  The Oracle court was 
not sympathetic to Google’s post hoc merger argument, however.  
The court instead commented that “copyrightability is focused 
on the choices available to the plaintiff at the time the computer 
program was created,”64 not at a later time when a subsequent 
user wishes to copy the program.  In the Oracle case, such 
choices were evident in the various ways that Oracle (or its 
predecessor Java author, Sun Microsystems) could have 
expressed the various functions accomplished by Java and 
copied by Google.  Indeed, “Google could have structured 
Android differently and could have chosen different ways to 
express and implement the functionality that it copied.”65  
Because Google enjoyed alternatives that were both “enough” 
and “as good,” copyright protection could properly subsist in 
Oracle’s expression. 
The cases outlined to this point serve to highlight two 
critical aspects of the idea-expression dichotomy.  First, they 
provide a view—albeit introductory—as to what an “idea” is.  An 
idea is a general statement of a work’s (or a subpart of a work’s) 
subject matter or aim—to provide a citation to a building code, 
to map a pipeline route, to communicate candle scents visually, 
or to implement certain functionality in a computer language.  
But as Learned Hand’s initial statement intimated, there 
remains some flexibility in the generality or specificity of an 
 
DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1171 (2007) [hereinafter Creativity and Culture in 
Copyright Theory]. 
62. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
63. Id. at 1347-48, 1350-51. 
64. Id. at 1370. 
65. Id. at 1368. 
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idea, without a clear definition as to when a move towards 
specificity converts the idea to expression.  The idea in the Veeck 
case could be recast more specifically as a citation to the specific 
building code of two towns in North Texas.  This would not have 
altered the outcome of the case, as merger occurs in either 
articulation of the idea offered here; but the move towards a 
more specific idea does not seem per se unreasonable.  One can 
imagine a similar change in a case like Oracle.  The idea there 
might not be to implement certain functionality in a computer 
language, but, hypothetically, to implement a cloning function 
in an object-oriented programming language using certain 
declarations required by that language.  The dividing line 
between idea and expression would seem mobile, indeed. 
The mobility in the line between idea and expression might 
present enough of a challenge on its own, but the idea/expression 
dichotomy features a second, critical complication.  Essentially, 
the dividing line between idea and expression does not just 
demarcate idea and expression, it determines their interplay in 
what could be compared to the two-body problem in physics.  
This latter problem considers the dynamic forces exerted 
between two bodies in space.  When the bodies move in space, it 
is not enough to measure the change in force exercised by one on 
the other; one must consider how the bodies dynamically 
exchange force in an ever-changing feedback loop.  There is a 
similarly dynamic feedback loop in play between idea and 
expression when the line dividing one from the other moves.  
One could consider the hypothetical change in idea for the Oracle 
case proposed above as one example of this.  The much-criticized 
case of Whelan Assocs. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,66 offers 
another.  There, the court confronted an accusation of 
infringement in certain dental management software,67 but the 
overlap between the software programs at issue was limited to 
the programs’ shared structure and functionality, not their 
actual source or object code.68  The court thus had to determine 
if copyrightable expression could subsist at a level of generality 
above the literal form of software code.  To structure this 
 
66. Whelan Assocs. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
67. Id. at 1224. 
68. Id. at 1233-34. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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analysis, the court concluded that “the line between idea and 
expression may be drawn with reference to the end sought to be 
achieved by the work in question.”69  The idea of “a computerized 
program for operating a dental laboratory would not in and of 
itself be subject to copyright,”70 while copyright could extend to 
the court’s conception of expression for software - “the manner 
in which the program operates, controls and regulates the 
computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, 
correlating, and producing useful information either on a screen, 
print-out or by audio communication.”71  This concept of 
expression followed directly from the court’s conclusion that 
there were “many ways”72 that a computer program could 
perform this set of functions.  Setting aside whether the Whelan 
court’s approach is correct, it may be observed that it established 
an extremely broad idea level when reviewing the software 
before it.  That choice had the practical effect of allowing 
expression to climb into higher levels of abstraction because its 
“idea” standard allowed for expressive alternatives at those 
levels.  So a very general definition of “idea” does not just move 
a line of demarcation between idea and expression, it feeds more 
and more alternatives into those levels of abstraction more 
specific than that idea.73  The “idea” crosses the very territorial 
boundary that it establishes.  The hypothetical example offered 
regarding the Oracle case would have precisely the opposite 
effect.  As the idea of the functionality implemented in the Java 
language became more specific, fewer alternatives would be 
available at more and more specific levels of abstraction, thereby 
 
69. Id. at 1236. 
70. Id. at 1238. 
71. Id. at 1239. 
72. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238. 
73. A different way of putting this appears in Lexmark Int’l., Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, where the court concluded that certain copier codes were 
not copyrightable. Lexmark Int’l., Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 
522 (6th Cir. 2004).  In this respect, it faulted the district court’s previous 
finding of alternatives in the codes by noting that the possible use of other 
constants in the codes “do not appear to represent alternative means of 
expressing the ideas or methods of operations embodied in the Toner Loading 
Program; they appear to be different ideas or methods of operation altogether.” 
Id. at 540.  Thus, by constricting the scope of the idea, potentially copyrightable 
alternatives were displaced from the space of protectable expression to the 
space of unprotected idea. This will be discussed more later in this Section. 
17
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doubly constricting the scope of copyright in a dynamic feedback 
loop.  Idea, viewed from this angle, serves both as line of 
demarcation to be distinguished from expression, and constraint 
that enters expression’s territory and applies a dynamically 
changing force. 
The functioning of the idea/expression dichotomy is of 
critical importance in the question of copyrightable creativity 
under Feist because it drives a methodological distinction 
between those courts that view the creativity inquiry as an 
extension of the idea/expression dichotomy and those that view 
the creativity inquiry as an entirely unrelated condition.  
Perhaps the best example of the first approach comes from the 
opinion in American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n.74  
In that case, the Seventh Circuit dealt with the purported 
infringement of American Dental’s taxonomy of dental 
procedures, comprised of both descriptions and serial numbers.75  
Delta Dental, which had copied most of American’s system in its 
own publication, defended in part on the ground that the 
taxonomy in question was not properly copyrightable.76  The 
Seventh Circuit disagreed with this contention, noting: 
 
Classification is a creative endeavor. Butterflies 
may be grouped by their color, or the shape of 
their wings, or their feeding or breeding habits, or 
their habitats, or the attributes of their 
caterpillars, or the sequence of their DNA; each 
scheme of classification could be expressed in 
multiple ways. Dental procedures could be 
classified by complexity, or by the tools necessary 
to perform them, or by the parts of the mouth 
involved, or by the anesthesia employed, or in any 
of a dozen different ways. The Code’s descriptions 
don’t ‘merge with the facts’ any more than a 
scientific description of butterfly attributes is part 
of a butterfly. There can be multiple, and equally 
original, biographies of the same person’s life, and 
 
74. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
75. Id. at 977. 
76. Id. at 978. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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multiple original taxonomies of a field of 
knowledge. Creativity marks the expression even 
after the fundamental scheme has been devised.77 
 
The court’s citation to Feist immediately prior to this, 
coupled with its use of the word “creative” within the paragraph, 
clarifies that its comments do relate to the question of 
copyrightable creativity.  Confusion as to the comments’ scope 
would be understandable, however. After all, the court mentions 
the non-creativity-informed doctrine of merger directly.  Its 
reasoning is also thoroughly consonant with the structure of 
traditional idea/expression inquiries.  When the court lists 
possible ways in which dental procedures could be classified, it 
is implicitly setting out an idea—the classification of dental 
procedures.  When it subsequently enumerates criteria by which 
the classification could be organized—complexity, tools, or 
anesthesia—it is generating a list of alternatives available based 
on the initial choice of idea.  The court then repeats the exercise 
in dictum with another example—that of the ‘idea” of a 
biography permitting the “expression” in the form of multiple 
alternatives.78 
 
77. Id. at 979 (internal citation omitted). 
78. That an alternatives-based test for copyrightable creativity is more or 
less equivalent to the traditional idea-expression determination is entirely 
consistent with the computer software infringement methodology described in 
Computer Association International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.  Computer Assoc. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).  In that case, the court adopted 
the so-called abstraction-filtration-comparison method to determine if a later 
piece of computer software infringed an earlier program.  Id.  The Second 
Circuit described its test as follows: 
 
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this approach, a 
court would first break down the allegedly infringed program 
into its constituent structural parts. Then, by examining each 
of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas, 
expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and 
elements that are taken from the public domain, a court 
would then be able to sift out all non-protectable material. 
Left with a kernel, or possible kernels, of creative expression 
after following this process of elimination, the court's last 
step would be to compare this material with the structure of 
an allegedly infringing program. 
 
Id. at 706.  As the court’s description and name of the test’s first step suggest, 
19
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The reading of Feist’s creativity standard in a manner 
coextensive with the traditional idea/expression inquiry raises 
two immediate complications.79  The first is an extension of an 
issue noted above—the two body problem of idea and expression. 
The court’s statements on butterflies, bicuspids, and biographies 
imply the determination of specific idea levels, but there is no 
reason to view these as the only possible idea levels.  The court 
could have imagined the idea of each falling at a more specific 
point, like “butterflies grouped by color,” “dental procedures 
grouped by complexity,” or the “biography of Urkel.”80  Each of 
these more specific idea choices would entail an associated 
constriction in the number of alternatives available to a creator 
acting on that idea.  Such more specific ideas would inevitably 
affect the scope of a work’s copyright; and if articulated in a 
sufficiently specific manner, they could go so far as to deprive a 
work of copyright entirely.  It would seem that the Seventh 
Circuit played somewhat fast and loose with this (inherently fast 
and loose) aspect of the creativity question. 
The second immediate complication of the American Dental 
court’s analysis is a question of redundancy.  Among the set of 
examples that the court offers to justify its holding of 
copyrightability in the dental taxonomy, a citation to Whelan v. 
Jaslow would be by no means out of place.  The idea of “a 
computerized program for operating a dental laboratory,”81 like 
a taxonomy of butterflies, would not be copyrightable, but the 
chosen expression of each among available alternatives could be.  
Yet the rationale in Whelan was not based on Feist; it could not 
be, as Feist was decided five years after Whelan.  This leads to 
the conclusion that the American Dental approach to creativity 
 
the court begins by employing Learned Hand’s abstraction method as a first 
step to separate idea from expression in a piece of software.  It then filters out 
idea and other unprotected expression, such as content completely constrained 
by programming language or other external factor (in other words, which have 
no alternative means of expression).  What remains, as the court notes, are 
“kernels of creative expression,” whose creativity inherently subsists in the 
alternatives available to express the kernels’ content.  Id. 
79. With additional criticisms to follow in Part III. 
80. Such a biography would presumably have at least one chapter 
dedicated to cheese.  For more on this reference, please refer to the sitcom 
Family Matters (ABC television broadcast 1989-1997). 
81. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320 
(E.D. Pa. 1985) 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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is not just consistent with the traditional idea/expression 
analysis, it is duplicative of it.  The very idea constraint leading 
to alternative expressive possibilities necessary to satisfy the 
idea/expression dichotomy in Whelan operates in American 
Dental to show creativity.  This does not seem a proper approach 
to the question of creativity, if only because it is inconsistent 
with the approach and methodology of the Supreme Court in 
Feist.  When considering the white pages before it in the latter 
case, the Court did not conclude that the idea of a white pages 
directory merged with the expression of that directory,82 such 
that the traditional idea/expression analysis would dispose of 
the case (and it certainly could have done so, for there are no 
alternatives to the traditional white pages format).  Instead, the 
Court initiated a new requirement which, it should be presumed, 
meant something more than the old one. 
Other cases that rely on an idea/expression structure for 
their own Feist-based inspiration address the risk of redundancy 
in tests by adding a new element to the old test: author selection 
or arrangement.  Here, the Article will take a brief turn to a 
“meta” level by rehashing Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West 
Pub. Co.,83 a case involving the copyrightability of various 
aspects of West case reporters so beloved by attorneys 
everywhere.  Because cases themselves are in the public domain, 
West’s claims to copyright were limited to those aspects of the 
reporter that they selected, in this case the content of the header 
at the top of each case.84  To guide its analysis, the court 
commented that “when it comes to the selection or arrangement 
of information, creativity inheres in making non-obvious choices 
from among more than a few options.”85  So it is already clear 
that the court would not limit itself to the typical idea-expression 
search for alternatives, it required a non-obvious selection from 
among those alternatives.  While the use of the patent term 
“non-obvious” is probably inappropriate in view of Feist, it does 
add a probabilistic shading to the basic alternatives test.  Rather 
than viewing all alternatives as equally likely, and merely 
 
82. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991). 
83. Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998). 
84. Id. at 683-85. 
85. Id. at 682. 
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tallying them to find possible copyrightability in each, the 
Matthew Bender court seems to require both a tallying and a 
related assessment of likelihood to find copyright in only those 
alternatives that are “non-obvious.”  The case also highlights the 
additional wrinkle that the alternative be chosen by the author 
among the others.  This analytical framework led the court to 
find that West’s various contributions to case headers were all 
insufficiently creative to merit copyright protection.86  The court 
acknowledged other cases where such creativity had been found, 
but emphasized the “exercise of judgments more evaluative and 
creative” than West’s.87 
It is doubtful, however, that the addition of a light 
probabilistic shading and an emphasis on a creator’s judgment 
and selection will meaningfully change the original 
idea/expression quantum in Feist creativity cases.  On the issue 
of probability, it should be recalled the scènes à faire doctrine 
already puts just such a light probabilistic shading in the 
traditional idea/expression context.  The doctrine accomplishes 
this by finding uncopyrightable, or at best of limited 
copyrightability, those expressions effectively generic or 
inherent to a work’s genre.88  An annoying and meddlesome 
neighbor on a sitcom would be one example of this phenomenon; 
the use of a parrot, eyepatch, and peg-leg for a pirate character 
would be another.  The core of the scènes à faire doctrine, then, 
is to find more probable forms of expression, and then eliminate 
or limit their protectability, in much the same way the modifier 
“non-obvious” would attach to less probable, and accordingly 
protectable, forms of expression.  So the Bender inquiry into the 
 
86. Id. at 688-89. 
87. Id. at 689. 
88. See, e.g., Incredible Tech. v. Virtual Tech., 284 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1079-
80 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (acknowledging in the context of competing golf video games 
that certain aspects of such a game may be subject to very thin copyright 
protection—“the wind meter and club selection features, for example, account 
for variables in a real game of golf and are indispensable to an accurate video 
representation of the sport.  The game selection features, such as the menu 
screens and player quit options, are standard to the video arcade game format, 
as is the fixed placement of certain icons around the border of the screen. . . . 
Though these elements are protected at least in their ‘shapes, sizes, colors, 
sequences, and arrangements,’ like the graphics on the control panel, they are 
to be treated as scenes a faire, and are afforded protection only from virtually 
identical copying.”). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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probability of a given alternative would not seem to change the 
traditional idea/expression quantum. 
The second supplement to the traditional idea/expression 
query proposed by the Bender case—author selection or 
judgment—would not seem to add very much to the test either.  
This much can be shown in practical terms.  As a baseline 
postulate for this statement, copyright must require no more 
than that authorial selection or arrangement happen at one 
time, any time in the creative process.  To conclude otherwise 
would eliminate copyright in well-timed photography, like 
Alfred Eisenstaedt’s famous shot of the sailor spontaneously 
kissing a woman in jubilation at the end of World War II.89  
Eisenstaedt clearly merited copyright for his well-timed shot, 
but he did not arrange anything at the time of the photograph.  
He merely exercised limited choice in pointing his camera, took 
the photograph and at a point sometime later selected it as 
worthy of adoption as his work.  If copyright is to protect 
Eisenstaedt’s work (as it should), it must, on occasion, accept a 
limited quantity and quality of artistic selection. Such selection 
may be no more than a post hoc act of adoption of an 
unintentionally created work.90  Most works will easily surpass 
this threshold, leaving the alternatives test, and not authorial 
selection, a dominant rudder in the space of many Feist-based 
creativity analyses.91  And if the alternatives test assumes such 
a role, then judicial assessment of creativity is necessarily 
 
89. This photograph is entitled V-J Day in Times Square. 
90. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(finding unintentional muscular twitches could result in copyrightable 
authorship).  See also Laura Heymann, A Tale of (at Least) Two Authors: 
Focusing Copyright Law on Process Over Product, 34 J. CORP. L. 1009, 1015 
(2009). 
 
The individual who accidentally creates ‘art’ through an 
involuntary mark on a paper or by spilling paint on a nearby 
canvas cannot, of course, have been motivated to do so by any 
incentives provided by the law. To the extent she is motivated 
at all, it is at the time of adoption of the work-the decision to 
call it one's ‘art’ rather than simply to discard it as trash. 
 
Id. 
91. One exception to this might be the use of computers to generate 
content without additional authorial choice.  See Random Numbers, supra note 
26, at 295. 
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subject to the two issues already noted above—inherent 
unpredictability according to a court’s determination of a work’s 
“idea,” and almost complete redundancy with previously existing 
modes of analysis.  It would seem that it is a court’s choice of 
idea and expressive alternatives, and not an author’s choice in 
expression, that matters most in the judicial assessment of 
creativity. 
The alternatives-based analysis of creativity under Feist 
presents further issues, which will be discussed in part III; but 
for now we would do well to introduce a few cases that view the 
Feist creativity inquiry as entirely separate from the 
alternatives-based analysis.  One such case is ATC Distribution 
Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission,92 involving the 
alleged copying of a parts catalog by the defendant’s founder 
after leaving the plaintiff’s employ.93 That this case treats the 
Feist inquiry as divergent from the idea/expression inquiry can 
be shown through the court’s comment that “original and 
creative ideas are not copyrightable.”94  A test for creativity that 
aligns with the traditional idea/expression analysis cannot make 
this comment, for creativity can only be found where there are 
sufficient expressive alternatives at an abstraction level more 
specific than a work’s idea.  The Whatever It Takes court further 
rejects a consistent reading of creativity and the idea/expression 
test when it acknowledged that the parts catalog at issue could 
have been arranged in alternative ways, yet the existence of 
such alternatives was insufficient to render the catalog 
creative.95  Yet the Whatever It Takes court, like the Feist court 
before it, provides almost no substance to its alternate 
understanding of copyrightable creativity. When opining that 
the catalog embodied “creative ideas,” the court immediately 
shifted to a regurgitation of the section 102(b) prohibitions on 
copyright, not an explanation as to why the ideas at issue were 
creative, but the expression thereof was not.96  When dismissing 
the catalog’s part numbers as uncreative, the court rejected 
 
92. ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission, 402 F.3d 
700 (6th Cir. 2005). 
93. Id. at 702-03. 
94. Id. at 707 (emphasis in original). 
95. Id. at 712. 
96. Id. at 707. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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copyright on the basis of randomness in the selection of parts 
numbers.97  The remaining copyright inquiries—on the 
arrangement of the catalog and the catalog’s illustrations—
offered no additional creativity in the court’s estimation, and the 
court offered little to no more guidance as to why it reached its 
result.98 
Other courts do only slightly better on the issue.99  Some 
focus more on the selection question already discussed above.100  
In Warren Pub., Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., for example, the 
court focused on choice among a universe of possible choices in 
the context of cable television directory.101  Yet this looks an 
awful lot like the alternatives-based methodology already 
discussed above.102  The court in Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor 
Sales U.S.A., Inc.103 highlighted the intent of the creator when 
considering 2-D digital depictions of originally 3-D Toyota 
cars.104  Yet intent seems something like a light spin on choice 
which, further, might not be amenable to many useful 
applications.  For one, intent sometimes fails to execute its 
vision in a final product, as in the notable Alfred Bell & Co. v. 
 
97. Id. at 709. 
98. Whatever It Takes, 402 F.3d at 710-13. 
99. Mandel, supra note 17, at 326 (“Judicial opinions, in fact, rarely even 
try to describe the artistic creative process, presumably because it is considered 
so ineffable. When opinions do describe authorial creativity they default to 
traditional right-brain artist conceptions, for instance, referring to ‘the 
mysterious ebb and flow of an artist's creative powers’ or an ‘intrinsically 
individualistic’ process.”). 
100. Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 
509, 513 (2d Cir. 1991). 
101. Warren Publ’g., Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
102. So, too, does the case of William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, although 
with a slight twist. William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 430 F. Supp. 2d 458 
(E.D. Pa. 2006).  There, the insurance form under scrutiny was deemed 
sufficiently creative under Feist because it was found to feature “numerous 
creative differences” in comparison to another similar form.  Id. at 466. 
Comparison to other similar artifacts, it might be a more concrete way of 
demonstrating the presence of creative content, yet it is functionally equivalent 
to the alternatives test for the obvious reason that it relies on such 
alternatives. 
103. Meshworks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 
(10th Cir. 2008). 
104. Id. at 1266.  
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Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. case,105 where exact replica engravings 
of famous art pieces could reflect the copyist engraver’s 
muscular twitch that contradicted the intent of the project (and 
merited copyright).106  Intent also seems most useful only in 
those disputes where creative intent is clear.  Such was the case 
in the Meshwerks case, as the 2-D digital depictions were 
intended to be nothing more than exact replicas of Toyota cars.107  
Creative intent is rarely so unambiguous or single-minded, 
however. 
Perhaps the best approach to creativity as an alternative to 
the alternatives-based query is that of then-Judge Alito’s dicta 
in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,108 where the Third Circuit 
considered the copyrightability of parts numbers.  Because of the 
part-numbering plaintiff’s reliance on an analogy between its 
creation and photography, Judge Alito felt it necessary to 
distinguish the cases: 
 
The Southco numbers convey information about a 
few objective characteristics of mundane products 
— for example, that a particular screw is one-
eighth of an inch in length.  A photographic 
portrait, by contrast, does not simply convey 
information about a few objective characteristics 
of the subject but may also convey more complex 
and indeterminate ideas.109 
 
In Alito’s view, creativity is a movement away from the 
merely functional and the accurate in representation in favor of 
greater complexity and indeterminacy.  Nowhere are 
alternatives to be found in this dicta.  The work and its own 
complexity and indeterminacy are the point of inquiry.  This may 
not be a full-fledged methodology, inasmuch as the court did not 
particularly apply it to the parts numbers at issue, nor explain 
how to discern the presence or necessary amount of complexity 
 
105. Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalada Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d 
Cir. 1951). 
106. Id. at 105. 
107. Meshwerks, Inc., 528 F.3d at 1270. 
108. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004). 
109. Id. at 284. 
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and indeterminacy.  Yet there is much to commend it, as it 
presents a sketch of creativity that does not answer to a 
distinction between ideas and expression.  The test’s very 
indeterminacy, if not amenable to completely predictable 
judicial decision-making as articulated, would allow a court the 
liberty to seek creativity in its many forms, not just through its 
genesis as an alternative among others answering to a single 
idea.  Judge Alito seems to be on to something with his view of 
creativity in Southco, and we will return to another view much 
like it when Part IV considers the philosopher Henri Bergson’s 
view of creativity.  But first, Part III will pursue the critique of 
the alternatives-based creativity standard. 
 
III. The Alternatives-Based Test as an Inaccurate Reflection of 
Creativity 
 
Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure.110 
So begins Marcel Proust’s novel (or series of novels), A la 
recherche du temps perdu.111  The line might be translated as, 
“For a long time, I went to bed early,” and it initiates a 
monolithic story following the narrator as he negotiates his 
relationships with his mother, Swann, and many other notable 
characters.  Setting aside the overwhelming suite to this incipit, 
one can begin to situate its importance on a smaller scale.  The 
noted semiotician Roland Barthes views this sentence as an 
opening for the first episode of the novel, where the work 
 
110. MARCEL PROUST, DU CÔTÉ DE CHEZ SWANN 3 (1988). 
111. I have left the title of the opus in its original French for almost the 
same reason that I have left the first line unchanged.  The translations of the 
title into English -- most typically, In Search of Lost Time or In Remembrance 
of Things Past—leave something to be desired.  The former most closely tracks 
the literal meaning of the title, but even that sacrifices an additional meaning 
of “temps perdu” (literally, “lost time”).  To do something à temps perdu in 
French is to do it in one’s spare time.  So the “lost time” of the first translation 
also has a connotation of “spare time”—Proust seeks not just the past, but a 
certain excess.  A second, but related, reason for leaving Proust’s title 
untranslated follows from the title of this very Article.  For in this Article, I am 
in search of something lost—not time (le temps), but meaning (le sens), and 
more specifically, the lost meaning of the term “creativity” in the context of 
copyright.  There is equally something excessive sought here, a spare meaning 
of creativity beyond that found in courts. 
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meditates on sleep.112  Sleep, for Barthes, is the organizational 
mode of Proust’s originality; yet in so organizing his work, the 
author actually disorganizes it.113  Proust’s narrator, by invoking 
sleep as a theme of his work, introduces a “false conscience,” a 
conscience that is “off-kilter, vacillating, intermittent.”114  
Through this conscience, the very “logical shell of Time is 
attacked,”115 and no strict chronological ordering is possible.  
This worthwhile reading of Proust’s first sentence goes a long 
way to showing how Proust was creative in the context of the 
fifty pages (and then, by extension, several thousand more) that 
followed this first line. 
Yet I would argue that Proust’s creativity can be situated on 
an even more microscopic scale—that of the sentence itself.  The 
sentence is actually quite unusual, the commonplace tenor of the 
translation notwithstanding.  To demonstrate this, here must 
intrude a brief explanation of the grammatical structure of the 
sentence, along with some additional background on French 
grammar more typically.  The oddity of the sentence flows from 
the choice of verb tense, le passé composé, or simple past, 
typically used to describe discrete events.  This tense functions 
in French in the same manner as the past tense in English when 
a list of past events is narrated.  The passé composé would be 
used for all three verbs in a translation of: “I went to the movies; 
I saw a movie; I came home.”  The French have a second primary 
past tense,116 l’imparfait, or imperfect, which describes past 
states that have a certain ongoing duration.  For an example of 
the equivalent in English, the verbs in the following would be 
translated to the imperfect in French—“I was happy,” or “I used 
to go to the movies.”  In his sentence above, Proust is invoking 
an activity that should have had a duration requiring use of the 
imperfect.  Instead of “I used to go to the movies,” he seems to 
mean, “I used to go to bed early.”  Yet he did not use the 
imperfect in the sentence to express this [je me couchais de bonne 
 
112. ROLAND BARTHES, LE BRUISSEMENT DE LA LANGUE 336 (Editions du 
Seuil 1984). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 337. 
115. Id. 
116. There are other past tenses in French, in particular, the passé simple 
and the plus que parfait, but they are not relevant here. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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heure]; he used the passé composé.  What took place for a “long 
time” is something that he has collapsed to form a single discrete 
event.  The logical shell of time is broken, indeed, but one need 
not look to the fifty pages that follow this opening line to prove 
it.  By altering something as simple as a single past tense to use 
a form that no one normally would, Proust has infused a single 
sentence with a remarkable dynamism in its complexity and 
seeming contradiction. 
The sentence is not just dynamic, though; it is plainly 
creative.  Supporting this conclusion is Ralph Clifford’s similar 
showing of creativity on a small scale through the example of the 
phrase “couch potato.”117  While “couch potato” has become an 
entirely typical slang saying, Clifford comments that there could 
be no “formulaic and deterministic transformation” that would 
lead to the combination of the words “couch” and “potato.”118  
Further, Clifford detected no repeatable process that would 
result in the phrase.119  The same indicia could equally apply to 
Proust’s sentence, where the shift in verb tense evades the 
formulaic and deterministic, and the probable in process, to 
achieve a high degree of creativity.  And to an even greater 
degree than the simple metaphor “couch potato,” Proust’s 
sentence manipulates the very conceptual basis of both his 
sentence and his work at large.  That must qualify as creative. 
Here points up the first of a number of additional 
methodological problems with the alternatives-based test for 
creativity under Feist.  Beyond the issues discussed above - the 
test’s potential redundancy vis-à-vis the idea/expression 
dichotomy and its inherent flexibility in selecting a point of 
demarcation between idea and expression, the test suffers from 
the drawback that it depends on the presence of alternatives to 
show creativity.  In the case of Proust’s sentence, a court could 
easily conclude that there are almost no alternatives whatsoever 
for the expressive choice that Proust made.  This would merely 
require that the court deem the sentence’s idea “a statement 
that one went to bed early,” or something of similar specificity.  
While the nature of the idea/expression dichotomy admits of 
certain mobility of the “idea” in the direction of generality, a 
 
117. Random Numbers, supra note 26, at 274. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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court would likely hesitate to assign an idea as general as “an 
opening sentence in a book” or “a sentence about sleep.”  To do 
so would result in the potential copyrightability of an enormous 
number of sentences that should not merit copyright 
protection—like “Call me Ishmael”120 or “she likes to sleep.”  
Neither of these sentences should be copyrightable, lest 
fundamental communicative tools be appropriated by a single 
copyright holder.  Indeed, a court’s need to foreclose copyright in 
the standard imperfect-tense form of Proust’s sentence—
longtemps je me couchais de bonne heure—would require that 
the court create an idea more or less coextensive with this 
standard form.  Once the idea is so defined, Proust’s highly 
creative sentence is just another alternative of its distinctly 
uncreative analogue. 
Further search for alternatives proves fruitless given an 
idea definition the likes of “a statement that one went to bed 
early.”121  The words in the sentence cannot be meaningfully 
reordered and still retain their meaning.  Certain words in the 
sentence have synonyms—de bonne heure could have been 
replaced by tôt, for example—but these are very limited in 
number.  Even allowing for the most generous range of 
synonyms, there are not enough, or as good, to satisfy a Lockean 
rationale.  For lack of expressive alternatives, Proust’s highly 
creative sentence would be deemed uncreative under a probable 
application of the test espoused by the Delta Dental court and 
others.  This seems a plainly incorrect result. 
Incorrect results would equally follow in the obverse case—
where the simple presence of alternatives suffices to show 
copyrightable creativity when actual creativity is quite limited.  
A reasonable example of this is the case of Kregos v. Associated 
 
120. This is the first sentence of Herman Melville’s MOBY DICK, of course. 
121. A court could reasonably go further in the direction of specificity in 
the case of the Proust sentence, of course. Such a move would only further 
garret the sentence’s creativity.  As Professor Leslie Kurtz pointed out, what 
makes a piece of poetry (she uses Keats) creative might reasonably be treated 
as an idea, albeit a complex one.  Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea 
and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1228-29 (1992).  In 
view of this, copyright would not find alternatives where a phrase provides the 
only articulation of a specific set of concepts. Proust’s sentence could fit within 
this analysis. 
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Press.122  The plaintiff Kregos created pitching stats forms for 
baseball games and distributed them to news outlets.123  His 
forms highlighted nine relevant pitching statistics for a given 
pitching match-up.  The appeal to the Second Circuit considered 
whether copyright protection in Kregos’ selection of statistics 
could be rejected as a matter of law.  The court found that it 
could not, reasoning: 
 
Kregos could have selected past performances 
from any number of recent starts, instead of using 
the three most recent starts. And he could have 
chosen to include strikeouts, walks, balks, or hit 
batters. By consulting play-by-play accounts of 
games, instead of box scores, he could have 
counted various items such as the number of 
innings in which the side was retired in order, or 
in which no runner advanced as far as second 
base. Or he could have focused on performance 
under pressure by computing the percentage of 
innings in which a runner scored out of total 
innings in which a runner reached second base, 
and he could have chosen to calculate this statistic 
for any number of recent starts. In short, there are 
at least scores of available statistics about 
pitching performance available to be calculated 
from the underlying data and therefore thousands 
of combinations of data that a selector can choose 
to include in a pitching form.124 
 
It was in part this set of possible alternatives that enabled 
the Second Circuit to accept the possibility of copyrightable 
creativity in Kregos’ pitching forms.  Yet it is not clear that a 
chosen set of nine pitching statistics is particularly creative.  
Perhaps it is sufficiently creative to satisfy Feist’s standard, but 
in no way does the existence of lots of possible statistics render 
a selection of a few among them creative.  So where the highly 
 
122. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991). 
123. Id. at 702. 
124. Id. at 704. 
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creative Proust might miss out on copyright for lack of 
alternatives, less creative authors compiling stats tables might 
receive copyright protection—and accordingly be deemed 
creative—due to the simple presence of other alternatives.  This, 
too, seems an incorrect result. 
There are still other issues with a test for creativity based 
on choice among expressive alternatives.  Barthes’ essay on the 
first sentence of Proust provides an entry-point to one such 
issue. It is in that writing that Barthes explains his 
identification with Proust in his own personal desire to write a 
novel.125  What unfolds here, then, is an interaction between 
actors in what Professor Julie Cohen calls a “cultural 
landscape.”126  This landscape is, in Cohen’s words, “a 
distributed set of cultural resources”127 with which individuals 
interact, including through creative processes.  This concept 
places more value on the human body128 as a mediator of creative 
production.  It is often through bodily interaction and access that 
creativity occurs—through iterative process in communication 
with cultural artifacts, and not as the result of an immediate 
creative spark.129  This view of creativity has been endorsed 
elsewhere.  Michael Madison, for example, highlights the 
“sometimes messy, unplanned, accidental, idiosyncratic nature 
of creativity and creation” when discussing how Shakespeare 
was known to have cribbed materials from cultural artifacts all 
around him.130 
For commentators like these, the critical myth that they aim 
to debunk is that of the romantic author.  This archetype posits 
a creator, toiling away alone, immune to the buffeting of the 
surrounding world, and creating something truly individual.  
This creator is often described as drawing immediate 
inspiration, in the form of a novel idea, through some odd 
stimulus, like the rusty spinning of a weathervane or the mosaic 
pattern in a kaleidoscope.  Of course, the problem with these 
 
125. See Barthes, supra note 112, at 333, 343-45. 
126. Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, supra note 61, at 1180. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1181. 
129. Id. at 1182. 
130. Michael J. Madison, Comment, Where does Creativity Come From? 
and Other Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 760 (2003). 
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myths is that they are just that—myths.  While one cannot 
disprove all such myths, one notable example might help paint 
the picture more clearly.  Isaac Newton, who is rightly revered 
for his mechanical theories, fits clearly within this mythology, 
as early twentieth century physicist Pierre Duhem 
demonstrated.  Duhem’s critique is coextensive with Cohen’s—
he faults the common person’s tendency to believe that scientific 
inspiration (and quite probably, inspiration in general) happens 
like a chicken hatching, or the touch of a magic wand to the 
theorist’s head.131  He then proceeds to trace at length how 
Newton answers to this flawed view of discovery.  The common 
myth conceives of Newton as having seen an apple fall in a field, 
and having thereby immediately discovered his mechanical 
laws.132  Nothing could be farther from the truth.  Duhem 
painstakingly133 shows, with a tracing of scientific history from 
Ancient Greece through Newton’s contemporaries, that 
Newton’s discovery had long been prepared.  Consider Newton’s 
gravitational equation, which measures force exerted between 
two objects by multiplying their masses by a constant and 
dividing that total by the square of the distance between the 
objects.134  Duhem notes that the study of light had already 
relied on a relation based on the inverse of a distance squared.  
The physicist Halley, among others, was conducting work 
relying on this very relation in the field of mechanics while 
Newton performed his own work.135 Newton, meanwhile, did not 
create his equation in an immediate flash.  His initial 
development of the law of gravitation occurred in 1665; but due 
to a widely accepted, but inaccurate, conception of the Earth’s 
size, he was unable to apply the law to his satisfaction until the 
inaccuracy cleared up . . . in 1682.136  So the falling apple myth 
and the immediate development of a law from a single idea goes 
right out the window.  What remains is Duhem’s observation 
 
131. PIERRE DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, SON OBJET, SA STRUCTURE 307 
(J. Vrin. 2007). 
132. Id. 
133. Duhem devotes 45 pages to this history.  See id. at 307-52. 
134. This is represented mathematically as F = g*M1*M2/r2, where g is the 
gravitational constant, the M’s are the masses of the objects, and r is the 
distance between them. 
135. Duhem, supra note 131, at 344. 
136. Id. at 345. 
33
  
834 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:3 
that the greatest ideas are often born of their time, as if “floating 
in the air, carried by the wind from one country to another.”137 
The idea/expression dichotomy—and associated 
alternatives-based test for copyrightable creativity—tend to 
serve the image of the romantic author, however.  By reducing 
the point of comparison for expression and creativity to a 
monolithic abstract idea, the author or creator who has such an 
idea and then articulates it through individual expression is 
well-served, for the test tracks exactly what this creator is doing.  
The test is less effective for those creators, even great ones like 
Newton, who wander in the wilderness for seventeen years 
developing work in close collaboration with the theories of their 
time.  This failure of the alternatives-based test is part and 
parcel of a certain binary that commentators like Professor 
Cohen seek to debunk, that which divides the intellectual 
property pirate from the romantic author.  While creators may 
undoubtedly be categorized along a spectrum from more original 
to more derivative work, Cohen highlights creation as a process 
that contains both internal and external, culturally-inspired 
components.138  There is no simple binary between romantic 
author and pirate.139 
Other binaries hardwired into copyright law’s creativity 
inquiry represent reasonable candidates for improvement.  
Cohen also criticizes the dichotomy’s methodological bias 
towards a natural rights versus economics binary.140  The former 
model concerns itself with the sets of rights that an author or 
 
137. Id. at 349. 
138. Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, supra note 61, at 1178. 
139. I would criticize Profs. Cohen and Madison for their failure to 
recognize the entire spectrum of more original to more derivative work.  Their 
models are highly geared towards facilitating the social and the socially 
accepted, regardless of the consequences of such activity on the incentive to 
create by later-comers.  Cohen, for example, mostly seems to want to construct 
an elaborate theory to allow non-commercial fan fiction at all costs, even if 
future authors would not produce or publish work because of the threat of fan 
fiction.  In other words, where the idea/expression dichotomy and the 
alternatives-based test (along with other aspects of current copyright doctrine, 
like joint author law) tend to favor a more romantic author-like creator, Cohen 
chooses to favor a more derivative creator to the detriment of authors who are 
more “romantic” in their creations. 
140. Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, supra note 61, at 1155. 
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creator should expect to enjoy as a matter of social ordering.141  
The latter model attempts to develop intellectual property law 
in a manner that best promotes market efficiency in the creation 
and dissemination of protected artifacts.142  Setting an artificial 
idea/expression limit is one way, depending on one’s view, of 
either ordering the expectations of authors or promoting an 
efficient market of intellectual property.  Authors can either 
expect a certain scope of protection, or market theorists can 
expect a certain availability of communicative tools while 
economically incentivizing expression.  Cohen seeks to see 
beyond this in her proposed decentered cultural landscape that 
serves as an engine for creativity. Professor Gregory Mandel 
supplements the economics-natural rights binary with another: 
that between stereotypes of right- versus left-brained thought.  
He offers this binary in criticism of joint author law’s tendency 
to view copyrightable creativity as right-brained, and patentable 
invention as left-brained.  He notes that “[s]tereotypes . . . are 
often both incorrect and dangerous, and such is the case here.  
Current research indicates that the common author and 
inventor stereotypes do not accurately portray actual creative 
processes.  As a result, the dichotomy between modes of 
creativity for authors versus inventors - in both perception and 
intellectual property law - is substantially exaggerated.”143  
Copyrightable creativity should not reflect merely those 
creations that seem more right-brained in origin.  The brain 
creates by marshaling both hemispheres in varying measures, 
and any creativity inquiry should be up to the task of accepting 
all such permutations of creativity. 
The alternatives-based methodology relies on a further 
problematic presumption—that there is a single set of 
abstractions.144  Abstractions are no more than a series of 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Mandel, supra note 17, at 331. 
144. One could add to this criticism a concern whether there is any set of 
abstractions once the method reaches a certain general level of abstraction.  
Many philosophers question the ability to abstract from the species or member 
of a class to the class itself, and then further to other universal statements.  
One such philosopher was George Berkeley, whose immaterialist doctrine was 
based in no small part on a rejection of abstraction.  He simply could not 
conceive of a truly abstract idea, instead feeling himself compelled to apply 
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Russian dolls in a court’s hands, sure to envelop each other 
coherently.  But just as the line between idea and expression can 
shift between levels of abstractions, the very levels of abstraction 
themselves can shift seismically.  It was the philosopher Alfred 
North Whitehead who pointed out that the first human to 
discover counting discovered a whole new way of abstracting as 
compared to all predecessors.145  The abstractions techniques 
used to conceive of a copyrightable work’s levels today might not 
look anything like such levels when conceived under new 
abstractions methodologies of tomorrow.  And even the 
abstractions technique outlined by Hand admits of numerous 
distinct permutations at higher levels of abstraction.  When 
considering the first fifty pages of A la recherche du temps perdu, 
is the idea “the story of a child who has an Oedipal complex?”  Is 
it “how memory is stimulated through pastry?”  Is it “how to 
convey a sleep state literarily” (à la Barthes)?  Any of these 
descriptions is possible, and none necessarily overlaps with 
another.  It is hard to trust a methodology dependent on such 
fundamental divergence. 
Professor Roberta Kwall would propose a criticism of the 
current creativity methodology in copyright from another 
perspective—its lack of concern for process.146  In this respect, 
she observes a broad-based “belief in the universality of ‘hidden 
organic development at some stage of the creative process.’”147  
Creativity is not the metaphorical lightbulb going on 
 
particular qualities to its allegedly abstract embodiment within his mind.  
GEORGE BERKELEY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND THREE DIALOGUES 
40-47 (Penguin Books 1988) (1710).  Karl Popper couches the impossibility of 
abstraction as a “problem of universals,” whereby a specific statement cannot 
be abstracted to a truly universal statement.  Instead, all that one can aspire 
to with specific statements is the creation of “classes of individuals.” KARL 
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 45 (Routledge Classics 2002) 
(1935). 
145. See generally ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN 
WORLD (The Free Press 1997). 
146. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The 
Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1965 
(2006) [hereinafter Inspiration and Innovation]; Kwall, Living Gardens, supra 
note 36; Roberta R. Kwall, Living Gardens, Living Art, Living Tradition, 5 I.P. 
THEORY 73 (2015); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Remember the Sabbath Day and 
Enhance Your Creativity!, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 820 (2013) [hereinafter 
Remember the Sabbath Day]. 
147. Inspiration and Innovation, supra note 146, at 1965. 
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immediately over the creator’s head; it is an ever-developing, 
ever-evolving process.  Yet copyright law generally applies only 
to a work of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,”148 and the alternatives-based methodology 
presumes an established snapshot of expression by which to 
gauge its alternatives.  This creates potentially incorrect 
results,149 as in the case finding a garden in Chicago 
uncopyrightable because its constant growth belied the required 
fixed form.150  Professor Kwall comments, by contrast, that the 
process of garden growth is really no different than the constant 
change and evolution inherent in every work of creativity, as 
such works represent the result of a process,151 not an 
instantaneous creation.  That process often includes necessary 
breaks or rests - periods of preparation and incubation that 
couple with other moments of illumination and verification.152  
The fluidity built into that evolution should not necessarily 
cause a loss of copyright, in Kwall’s view.153  Creativity follows a 
wide permutation of movements, evolutions, and processes, to 
which copyright’s current doctrines seem particularly ill-suited.  
Any effective view of creativity must, on some level, consider 
creative process.154 
By way of a final critique of the alternatives methodology 
for copyrightable creativity, the test comes across as highly 
unrealistic.  Never have two human beings engaged in a 
dialogue akin to the following: 
 
Person 1: That movie was really creative, don’t 
you think? 
 
148. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
149. Living Gardens, supra note 36, at 912-14. 
150. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
151. Living Gardens, supra note 36, at 917 (invoking “the fluidity that 
exists in all of Creation”). 
152. Remember the Sabbath Day, supra note 146, at 833-34. 
153. Living Gardens, supra note 36, at 906 (“[T]he degree of fluidity of a 
given work [should be taken into account] in determining its copyrightability, 
[but] the presence of fluidity should not, in and of itself, act as a bar to 
copyright protection based on the work's inability to satisfy the fixation 
requirement.”). 
154. Professor Clifford believes process should figure in a creativity 
analysis for a more limited reason—to ensure that strictly computer-generated 
artifacts do not pass muster.  Random Numbers, supra note 26, at 272. 
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Person 2: Yes, absolutely, the filmmaker really 
selected from one of many alternative ways of 
expressing the various ideas captured on film. 
Person 1: I couldn’t have said it better myself. 
 
In other words, no one thinks of creativity the way that 
courts applying the alternatives-based methodology do.  In view 
of this, and the legion other criticisms lofted in the test’s 
direction above, there must be a better-conceived, more natural 
way for courts to determine the presence of creativity as dictated 
by Feist.  The next section will offer one possible candidate, 
taken from the field of philosophy.  As Justice Story once 
compared copyright to “the metaphysics of the law,”155 reliance 
on philosophy to supplement copyright theory is by no means 
inappropriate.  With that in mind, let us see what the 
philosopher Henri Bergson has to say about creativity.156 
 
IV. A Bergsonian View of Creativity 
 
It would seem an insurmountable task to try to summarize 
a philosopher’s entire work in a few sentences or paragraphs.  
This measure of caution should apply all the more to a 
philosopher with as long and distinguished a career as Henri 
Bergson, whose Essai sur les données immédiates de la 
conscience opened a parenthesis in 1889 that would not close 
before he received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927 and 
published La Pensée et le Mouvant in 1934.  To summarize 
briefly a career made up of over forty years of relentlessly 
 
155. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
156. Professor Russ VerSteeg acknowledges Bergson’s interest in this 
topic in one of his articles, listing Bergson along with Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes, among others.  Any of these other philosophers might have served 
here, though in very different ways; but for now, I would propose focusing on 
Bergson as a legitimate choice of topic in VerSteeg’s view.  VerSteeg, supra 
note 44, at 826. Karl Popper would have fully endorsed a use of Bergson in the 
pursuit of a definition of creativity.  See Popper, supra note 144, at 8 (“[M]y 
view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a 
logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process.  
My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an 
irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense.”).  Popper’s 
criticisms find much support in the philosophy of Bergson, as this Section will 
demonstrate. 
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plumbing the depths of something as complicated as human 
existence—would seem a fool’s errand, destined to omit far more 
than could be included.  Yet Bergson himself believes that just 
such a summary is not only possible; it is potentially a desirable 
product of the nature of philosophy itself.  Observers of the 
history of philosophy, Bergson notes, are initially tempted to see 
in a philosopher’s work a somewhat complicated edifice drawing 
on a wide variety of historical influences to be arranged in a 
coherent, if substantial, whole.157  Close, prolonged contact with 
a philosopher’s work reveals this initial view to be overwrought.  
As the observer places herself in the thought of the philosopher, 
the initial complication of that thought sloughs off gradually, 
revealing a “single point” [un point unique], “something simple, 
infinitely so.”158  So simple, in fact, that the philosopher could 
not articulate it, and was instead driven to try explain this single 
point through an ever-expanding series of complications and 
abstractions aimed at chasing the “fleeing and evanescent 
image” haunting the philosophy.159  What begins as infinitesimal 
intuition in theory ends up infinite instantiation in practice.  The 
goal of the observer of philosophy might be couched as an 
attempt to retrace the philosopher’s footsteps in the opposite 
direction—to unravel and distill the complexity of the final 
doctrine to uncover the original intuition animating it all.  If 
Bergson is willing to invite this sort of methodological practice 
in conjunction with the work of other philosophers, there is no 
coherent reason not to take up the invitation for Bergson’s own 
work.  That is precisely what this Section will initially attempt, 
to distill some of Bergson’s concepts and theories into a more 
summary form (if not to reach Bergson’s single initial intuition).  
That process of distillation will permit a second step, an 
application of Bergson’s theories to the concept of “creativity,” 
both as the term is conceived legally and as it might be conceived 
more generally.  Much as the previous Section revealed a 
fundamental rift between the legal conception of creativity 
under copyright law and the “real-world” conception of the term, 
this Section will demonstrate a rift between the former notion of 
 
157. HENRI BERGSON, LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT 154-55 (2014) 
[hereinafter LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT]. 
158. Id. at 155. 
159. Id. 
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creativity and its philosophical analogue.  As this distinction 
becomes clearer, a new, more intuitive understanding of 
creativity might supplant the legally structured, and hopelessly 
flawed, iteration of the term. 
Reliance on Bergsonian philosophy to sketch a concept of 
creativity does not seem misplaced when one considers that the 
title of Bergson’s most famous work is often translated into 
English as The Creative Evolution.  Questions of translation 
aside,160 some of the doctrinal concepts described in that book 
serve as a possible jumping-off point when considering Bergson 
as a philosopher of creativity.  If I were to answer Bergson’s défi 
and attempt to summarize his work in one sentence, his is a 
philosophy of life as a continual, unpredictable process of 
unfolding, evolving, and becoming [devenir] that takes place 
over a certain indivisible period of time [durée].161  Each of these 
terms is quite general, and must remain so to a certain extent, 
even after more in-depth analysis—for it is precisely analysis 
and language under the guise of reasoning and logic that causes 
these terms to lose their inherent force or élan vital.162  The 
latter point is part and parcel of Bergson’s primary critique of 
traditional human reasoning, and it is from the perspective of 
this critique that Bergson’s more positive assertions might take 
shape. Put differently, with Bergson, comprehensibility is better 
served when beginning with negation before passing to 
affirmation. 
Bergson’s criticism of traditional human reasoning rests on 
an ostensibly realistic view of that reasoning’s source.  In an echo 
of his predecessor Darwin, Bergson contends that human beings 
 
160. The French title L’évolution créatrice does not track exactly to The 
Creative Evolution in the most apparent sense of the translation.  This is due 
to Bergson’s use of the word créatrice, which has a distinctly spiritual 
connotation in French, something almost akin to creationist.  “Creative” in the 
usual meaning of the word is créatif in French. 
161. As mentioned above, this definition lends credibility to a reading that 
Bergson fits within the philosophical field known as Process Thought.  In this 
respect, see Kwall, The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process 
Theology, supra note 36, at 893 (“The essence of Process Thought is that all of 
creation is constantly in process-always dynamic, and always in motion.”).  
Clearly, there is substantial overlap between this definition and the summary 
of Bergson’s philosophy proffered here. 
162. See, e.g., HENRI BERGSON, L’ÉVOLUTION CRÉATRICE 250 (2008 ed.) 
[hereinafter L’évolution créatrice]. 
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have fundamentally evolved to perceive the world around them 
in manner that best serves their survival.163  Human intelligence 
has developed, according to this evolution, in a manner that 
prepares humans to act on their surroundings most 
successfully.164  Human conscience and memory serve, first and 
foremost, to oversee action and to clarify choice when acting.165  
Success in action is most likely to occur when a human can 
isolate what is perceived in the present as a sort of momentary 
snapshot, and compare it to similarly momentary snapshots 
stored in memory.166  That process allows for a prediction of an 
effect, given the actor’s possible responses as cause.  Buttressing 
this process, lending it an apparent reliability, is an implication 
of repetition - that if events that looked and felt a certain way in 
the past produced a certain result, then events that look and feel 
that way in the present will do likewise.167  Equally included is 
an assumption of reversibility—events that can be redone must, 
to a certain extent, be undone before they can be performed 
again.  As a consequence of this reversibility and repeatability, 
it may be concluded that reality can be broken down into isolated 
and independent groups.168 
Science, and geometry in particular, according to Bergson, 
take the preformed repeatability and reversibility to its extreme 
end point.  Bergson offers a small stove boiling water in a pan to 
demonstrate this.169  Once the boiling of water on the stove has 
been observed, it is natural to conclude that this same process 
would occur in exactly the same way at any later time.170  In this 
respect, the act of boiling water once is reduced to a member of 
a class predicated on no more than a geometric relation.  If one 
has a lit boiler with a pan full of water on it, one will have boiled 
water in an “if x, then y” relation. Such a relation is precisely the 
equivalent of a right triangle, where two sides are known and 
 
163. Id. at 29. 
164. Id. 
165. HENRI BERGSON, MATIÈRE ET MÉMOIRE 190 (Denis Forest and Paul-
Antoine Miquel eds., Flammarion 2012) [hereinafter MATIÈRE ET MÉMOIRE]. 
166. L’ÉVOLUTION CRÉATRICE, supra note 162, at 29. 
167. Id. at 224-26. 
168. Id. at 215. 
169. Id. at 215-17. 
170. Id. at 216. 
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the length of the third is sought.171 The mental move here, as 
with thought guiding human action more generally, is towards 
a more generic space of repeatable and reversible abstraction. 
The conversion of reality into such abstract or generic 
groups, or at an even finer level, snapshots, is related to a 
phenomenon that Bergson calls la méthode 
cinématographique—a movie-like method of perceiving 
reality.172  As an example of this, Bergson proposes the flight of 
an arrow.173  The natural tendency when imagining such a flight 
is to picture the arrow at a certain number of discrete points 
along its path—at t0, the arrow is in the quiver; at t1, it has 
traveled a certain distance to a certain point; at t2, it might be at 
the midpoint of its flight; and so on.  It is precisely this sort of 
decomposition of space and time that informed Zeno’s famous 
paradox of the tortoise and Achilles.  By decomposing the arrow’s 
movement to render it susceptible to understanding, the viewer 
both cuts space and collapses time, reducing these two 
dimensions as necessary.  If further understanding is needed, 
the viewer need only add further snapshots between those 
already gathered in an attempt to complete the line.  The 
dynamic movement of an object, then, is no more than a series 
of coordinates that articulate like a fan, according to the viewer’s 
whim—able to collapse snapshots to simultaneity or stretch 
them out in space and time, as desired.  It is precisely this idea 
that animates human thought when a process is subdivided into 
stages.  The life course of a human might accordingly be 
comprised of four stages—childhood, adolescence, adulthood, 
and old age.174  Each of these four stages represents a “real 
stopping point”175 [arrêt réel] concentrating the movement of a 
prolonged portion of life into a single fixed or immobile 
 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 306. 
173. He proposes a number of models to describe this, actually.  His hand 
moving from point A to B is another example of such a model.  MATIÈRE ET 
MÉMOIRE, supra note 165, at 238.  Zeno’s paradox of Achilles chasing the 
tortoise but never catching it is yet another.  Id. at 239; L’ÉVOLUTION 
CRÉATRICE, supra note 162, at 310-11.  This concept is probably one of Bergson’s 
most common themes. 
174. Id. at 311. 
175. Id. 
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moment.176 
The common thread through each of these examples, from 
the boiling water and the flying arrow to the racing reptile and 
the aging human, is a tendency to reduce transition and 
movement to mere “things” in “states.”  The water boiling in the 
pan is not a specific, stochastic variant different from all others 
somewhat like it; it is just another example identical to others 
like it among a class of things.  The tortoise outpacing Achilles 
is not endowed with specific characteristics; it is just an object 
subdividing space into asymptotically decreasing halves like any 
other.  And for each of these things, there is, in a given movie 
snapshot, an associated state. The arrow at a specific point 
directed at a specific angle is in one such state.  The human is in 
a state of youth, adolescence, adulthood, or old age. 
The similarities between this manner of reasoning and the 
rationale underpinning the abstractions test should be 
immediately clear.  But Bergson brings the comparison into even 
sharper relief when he discusses artistic or literary creation in 
his essay Le possible et le réel.177  There, Bergson describes a 
question that an interviewer posed to him asking him to predict 
the future of literature following World War I.178  When Bergson 
punted on that question, the follow-up question plumbs 
Bergson’s views on what might be possible in then-future 
literary currents.179  Bergson again bristles at the question, due 
to its presumption that Bergson somehow holds the “key” to a 
metaphorical wardrobe of possibilities for future literature.180  
No, he responds, “the work of which you speak is not possible 
yet.”181  The most Bergson would concede to the interviewer is 
that eventually, the work will have been.182 
What does Bergson mean when dismissing speculation on 
the possible future of literature? In part, he views the term 
“possible” as subject to two potential meanings, only one of 
which would make sense in the mouth of his interviewer. This 
 
176. Id. 
177. LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT, supra note 157, at 135-51. 
178. Id. at 145. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
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latter meaning of “possible,” he suggests, is “that which 
encounters no insurmountable obstacle to its creation.”183  This 
is the negative sense of the word possible, which would lead to a 
literature susceptible of any number of future permutations, to 
the extent that they are not completely foreclosed.184  From this 
perspective, Bergson might theoretically speculate on future 
literature, but his speculation would be almost unlimited in 
scope.  What took Bergson aback, by contrast, was the positive 
form of the word “possible” implied in the interviewer’s 
question—a form that Bergson takes to mean “that which 
preexists in the form of an idea.”185  This second meaning of 
“possible” is an “absurdity”186 in Bergson’s estimation.  A work 
only becomes possible at the precise moment when its creator 
pens or paints it, the work being the specific product of that 
specific person in that specific time.187  Hamlet, Bergson offers 
as an example, could not be possible except as Shakespeare 
wrote it at the time when he wrote it.188  What Bergson 
underscores, then, is a fundamental change in polarity in how 
possibility should be conceived—rather than adhere to the 
traditional construction in which the possible becomes real, it is 
actually the real that becomes retrospectively possible at the 
time of the former’s genesis.189  There is no competition among 
possibilities, just a constant, ever renewed, surge of 
unpredictable novelty, or newness, and this newness is not 
limited to the world of art of high theater; it envelops every being 
at all times in a profoundly liberated environment.190 
 
183. LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT, supra note 157, at 147. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 148. Paul Feyerabend appears to agree with this view of the 
creative process. When speaking of the relation between idea and action, he 
notes that “[i]t is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct 
understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation 
and their institutional expression.” This view, however, is mistaken in his 
opinion—“Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct 
idea of a thing, are often parts of one and the same indivisible process and 
cannot be separated without bringing the analysis to a stop.” PAUL 
FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 10 (4th ed. Verso 2010). 
188. Id. at 147-48. 
189. Id. at 149. 
190. Id. at 150. 
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Bergson’s view on possibility is certainly not above criticism 
for depicting the entirety of existence as a cloud of near-complete 
indeterminacy.  There is a classic thought experiment that 
suggests that an infinite number of monkeys chained to 
typewriters would eventually write all of Shakespeare, 
including, of course, Hamlet.  Should a monkey actually sit down 
and type Hamlet, Bergson would acknowledge that his 
production will have been possible at its completion. Prior to 
that, it was only “possible” in the sense that the obstacles to it—
like the monkey’s motor skills and general lack of knowledge as 
to what was going on—could be overcome.  Yet in reality, the 
monkey producing Hamlet is possible under both meanings of 
the term; it is just extraordinarily improbable.  As every letter 
chosen by the monkey represents a one in twenty-six chance,191 
and the series of letters chosen comprise that same probability 
as independent events, then the probability is simply 1/26n, 
where n is the number of letters in Hamlet.  That is very close to 
zero, but it is not actually zero.  Bergson does not seem to allow 
for such a probabilistic approach, as all events are coded with 
what could be deemed a probability of zero until they happen, at 
which time their probability instantaneously becomes one. 
That criticism aside, let us take Bergson’s Hamlet example 
at face value and imagine what it has to say about the 
abstractions- or alternatives-based test for copyrightable 
creativity.  Needless to say, his view of the test would not be 
favorable, for the test seems to do any number of things that he 
criticizes.  First and foremost, the test is based on a method of 
abstraction which gradually removes the detail from a given 
work to render it a non-specific member of a class of works 
answering to the abstraction.  This move is entirely consistent 
with the traditional form of human reasoning that Bergson 
critiques.  In this way, the structure of an alternatives-based test 
begins by treating the creation of the work at issue somewhat 
like the arrow in flight or the stages of life.  It reduces the work 
to a snapshot in time, in its fixed form, and then removes the 
work’s vital details to make it part of a class.  As noted above, no 
thought is given to the development or process that went into 
the creation of the work.  Then the work is inserted into 
 
191. The number would be somewhat greater if various punctuation 
marks, spaces, and numbers were included. 
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Bergson’s boiler paradigm as part of the question whether 
alternatives do exist—for what is a court doing when 
determining the expressive alternatives available for a specific 
idea, if not posing an infinitely repeatable if x, then y relation?  
Instead of the x and y here, however, the court places a given 
idea in the place of the condition, and the potentially 
copyrightable work in the place of the condition’s output.  The 
court does not particularly concern itself with when or how this 
creation took place, the creation process is presumed identical 
and repeatable at all times.  And all forms of expression 
answering to the idea might as well be equivalent or fungible, 
with all the variety and verve of basic boiling water.  Put 
differently, it is the fact that each expressive alternative is just 
as good as another that makes a work copyrightable, a 
conclusion rooted in homogeneous equivalence. 
There is, of course, some play permitted in this divergence 
of a single abstract idea leading to many potential expressive 
alternatives.  Yet even if the court can theoretically imagine 
expressive alternatives as non-equivalent when divorced from 
the homogenizing idea, it still runs into certain additional 
complications.  One is Bergson’s view of the “possible.” Before it, 
the court has one concrete example of what is possible, the work 
whose copyrightability it is probing.  The latter work is possible 
under Bergson’s view, of course, because it has come into being.  
Then and only then did the work become possible.  It was not, as 
the abstractions methodology implies, possible prior to its 
creation - as if the work’s author or artist got an idea in an 
abstract form and the work immediately took shape as a 
possibility chosen among others.  The court’s methodology relies 
on an a priori view of creativity that defines the work as possible 
in the sense of “that which preexists in the form of an idea,” a 
move that Bergson would contest.  The court applies the label 
“possible” to a work at a time when the work was still entirely 
undetermined.  Needless to say, what goes for the work here goes 
double for the alternatives imagined by the court.  Not only were 
they not “possible” (in the Bergsonian sense of the word) at the 
time of the work’s creation, but they have not become possible in 
the intervening time leading to the copyright litigation.  Where 
Bergson refused to subscribe to the existence of a wardrobe of 
possibilities when queried on future literature, a court using the 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/3
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alternatives-based test presumes the existence of just such a 
wardrobe, and further claims to possess its key.192 
Any potential non-equivalence among the alternatives 
packing a court’s wardrobe is further belied by the very space in 
which the alternatives operate. Because a court generally193 
considers all alternatives equally good, the imaginary space in 
which these alternatives exist is a homogeneous one.  The court 
metaphorically draws a graph of Cartesian space, and assigns 
each square an alternative equal in size and shape to every other 
alternative.  It is not enough that the court has the key to the 
rectilinear wardrobe; it further creates sub-compartments 
within that space.  This type of homogeneous space nested 
within further homogeneous space is precisely what Bergson 
decries as an incorrect manner of perceiving reality.194  
Homogeneous space, according to Bergson, is an empty 
container built of “rigid abstractions,” that must be replaced.195 
The key to resurrecting a new definition of creativity, in the 
Bergsonian sense, is to determine what should replace the 
homogeneous space of the abstractions test.  What should 
replace the snapshots on an arrow’s path or the repeatability of 
a stove’s boiled water.  Bergson’s answer to this escapes simple 
summary or structure, ever reforming itself in lockstep with 
ever-changing reality.196  Matter, far from being susceptible to 
 
192. Even if there were such a wardrobe, I would be inclined to treat it as 
opening indefinitely—to Narnia or any other universe imaginable, not as some 
rigid, cleanly lined compartment. 
193. The scènes à faire doctrine is a slight exception to this rule.  See supra 
note 88. 
194. MATIÈRE ET MÉMOIRE, supra note 165, at 295. 
195. Id. 
196. As we begin to build a positive definition of creativity, I would like to 
take a moment to incorporate a few thoughts on one of Bergson’s most popular 
works, Le rire (or “Laughter”), his study of the comedic. HENRI BERGSON, 
LAUGHTER: AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF THE COMIC (Cloudesly Brereton and 
Fred Rothwell ed. & trans., The MacMillan Company 1914).  His thesis there, 
presented most broadly, is that the comedic is that which goes against social 
convention, most specifically in the direction of the mechanical.  Where the 
social is a space of changing life, the characters who are robotic or wooden in 
their behavior break with this in a way that people find funny.  If the book was 
published well over 100 years ago (in 1900), its ideas still resonate today.  The 
character Sheldon Cooper has not only cited to the book on The Big Bang 
Theory, he is an incarnation of the book’s observations in his robotically logical 
behavior.  Setting that aside, Bergson’s thesis in Le rire would seem to throw 
a wrench in this Article’s line of reasoning. Indeed, it is posited that creativity 
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subdivision in different snapshots according to the méthode 
cinématographique, is overflowing with “innumerable 
agitations”197 [ébranlements sans nombre] emitting so many 
“shivers”198 [frissons] continuously in all directions.  It is this 
movement as a continual phenomenon or unfolding, like the set 
of ever-varying waves hitting the shore, that characterizes what 
Bergson calls la durée, or duration.  This concept of movement 
through time is a totalizing curve, hiding behind the indefinitely 
divided images that human perception gathers; and it is the 
ultimate task to restore pure continuity where there is but 
discontinuity and abstraction.199 
Clearly, an application of Bergson’s view of reality as a 
process of constant, indeterminate “coming into being” does not 
lend itself to an easy or simple definition of creativity in either 
the legal or more general sense.  Yet it should be clear what 
should not factor in any understanding of creativity—
abstractions of other “possible” works that respond to the same 
“idea.”  Each act of creativity is a total, indivisible process 
incomparable to others like it, whose development springs from 
a certain measure of indeterminacy.  Comparing “alternatives” 
 
is something more than the mechanical and robotic.  Yet it is precisely such 
woodenness that makes comedy creative.  So is comedy an exception or 
violation of the premise proposed here?  There is an answer to this—the 
equivalence between the mechanical in art and the mechanical in reasoning is 
a false one.  When presenting the mechanical in a comedic setting, the author 
or playwright is not removing creativity to replace it with a rigidity 
characteristic of the boiling water and arrow examples.  Instead, that author 
or playwright is infusing the wooden with creativity, passing the former 
through the latter’s filter.  Further, a lot of what makes the comedic funny is 
not just the separation between the audience’s expectations and a character’s 
behavior, it is that same separation played out between characters on stage.  
Alceste, the main character of Molière’s Le Misanthrope (oft cited by Bergson 
in Le rire) is funny because of how his odd behavior puts off the other 
characters. So while there are potentially similarities between the woodenness 
of traditional human reasoning and the woodenness of the comedic, such 
similarities are only superficial. 
197. MATIÈRE ET MÉMOIRE, supra note 165, at 257. 
198. Id. at 258. 
199. Id. at 233.  It should be noted that this conclusion is fully consonant 
with Professor Kwall’s view that copyright’s scope should include the ever-
changing.  See Living Gardens, supra note 36, at 909 (noting that “[a] system 
of copyright protection that fails to consider the relevance of fluidity of works 
of authorship is out of step with how creation occurs in theory and in 
practice.”). 
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to this process does not make any sense for those alternatives do 
not exist, and could not have come into being.  All that remains 
for a court to consider, when assessing a work’s creativity, is 
both the process that led to a work’s genesis and the work that 
followed as a result.  Each should be reviewed in a totalizing 
manner—the process and the work as indivisible wholes.  The 
court would accordingly ask two general questions—1) what 
intellectual movement brought a work into being?, and 2) what 
work resulted? If any meaningful indeterminacy characterizes 
this process or its temporarily captured outcome, then the 
presence of creativity—both legal and more general - should 
follow.  Creativity should quite simply map to the presence of 
indeterminacy in an artifact and its creation process.  And 
because Bergson views the rippling of indeterminacy as a 
characteristic of both the exemplary and the mundane in life, 
creativity should be an easy bar to satisfy on these two counts—
just as Feist arbitrarily seemed to require.  At the same time, 
while Bergson seems to find the indeterminate in all things, 
there must be a lower limit to that.  Here, it may be necessary 
to propose the existence of the strictly determinate or nearly 
determinate, a proposal that Bergson seems to resist.  A 
traditionally designed white pages, based on a fixed set of phone 
numbers and names, would seem a highly determinate 
arrangement, the minor risk of errors notwithstanding.  A 
Bergson-inspired bar for copyrightable creativity could detect 
this rare case by observing where typically dominant 
indeterminacy yields to the highly determinate in a specific set 
of cases.  Just as Bergson is chary of observing determinacy, so 
too should courts avoid such a finding under the methodology 
proposed here. 
If this seems a bit fluid, it unfortunately must be so.  There 
is no simple definition of creativity, just as there is no simple, 
perfectly precise reduction of the infinitely permutable variation 
of the perceived universe.200  Bergson does, however, provide 
some clue as to how a creativity analysis might work when he 
 
200. Science is not such a reduction. There are lots of good 
approximations—like Newtonian mechanics to model the behavior of solid 
objects on the surface of the Earth—yet any number of other models could have 
been devised to describe “reality” equally well.  In fact, Duhem was one of the 
parties responsible for this proposition. 
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discusses his mentor Félix Ravaisson’s analysis of the Mona 
Lisa.201  He begins by quoting da Vinci’s observation that “every 
living being is characterized by an undulating or serpentine line, 
and art’s object is to render that individual form” on the canvas, 
in sculpture, or whatever medium is selected.202  This line that 
art seeks to represent need not be visible in the final piece of art, 
Bergson comments, yet it is this line that holds the key to the 
entire work.203  Thus does Bergson observe in the Mona Lisa a 
tendency of the painted lines to climb towards a “virtual 
center”204 situated “behind the canvas,”205 where a single word 
would solve the famous smile’s sphingian mystery.206  For 
Bergson, this is art, and by extension, creativity—the dynamic 
consolidation and presentation of the simplest of thoughts 
beyond what the eye can immediately see.207  Perhaps one should 
not expect most works to live up to the creative genius of the 
Mona Lisa—for few do—yet the very movement that Leonardo’s 
canvas, or Proust’s incipit, captures in an ethereal center is 
present in differing degrees in a child’s study hall doodle, a 
grainy recording of a campfire singalong, or a hastily penned 
short story chronicling a vampire’s travails.  Works like these 
are creative, and should be copyrightable. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
And so, to a certain extent, we have come full circle, as the 
very Leonardo that the Rutgers computer program deemed 
“creative” answers equally to a Bergsonian definition of 
creativity.  The two methodologies for reaching this same result 
rest at opposite ends of a spectrum, however.  On one hand, the 
Rutgers software defines creativity according to a fixed formula, 
measuring influence and novelty according to a pre-determined 
database of images fed to it.  It is an impressive piece of software, 
of course, but its results are completely certain given both the 
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material input to it and its encoded algorithm.  At the other end 
of the spectrum lies the Bergsonian view just disclosed, where 
the method for detecting creativity is as potentially varied as the 
creative process itself.  Creativity might flow from any of a 
seemingly infinite set of processes - from the constrained to the 
unconstrained, from the left-brained to the right-brained, or 
from the economically motivated to the culturally born.  There, 
what is prized is not a work’s ability to respond to an algorithm 
measuring influence on later works, but its almost inherent 
novelty bound up in the inherent novelty of life.  It is no 
coincidence that Bergson’s most famous work is translated as 
The Creative Evolution—the passage of time, and by extension, 
human creation that marks it, is ever evolving and renewing 
itself.  That movement is not reducible to snapshots or single 
images, least of all those snapshots and images that might be 
fed into even the most sophisticated computer program.  The 
indeterminate process and genesis of a creative work finds its 
reflection in the method that seeks such indeterminacy, not in 
the rote application of a rigid rule structure. 
Somewhere between the two poles occupied by the 
indeterminate and the rote sits the abstraction-based test that 
courts use to find creativity based on the presence of expressive 
alternatives. Such expressive alternatives serve essentially the 
same purpose as the paintings fed into the computer software—
that of reducing creativity to a series of fixed options.  The court’s 
methodology, in some respects, is even more wooden than its 
coded counterpart.  While the latter takes into account a certain 
chronological ordering and development of works over time, the 
abstractions test reduces creativity to a series of alternatives 
available at a single instant, that of the potentially 
copyrightable work’s creation.  Generally speaking, there is no 
probabilistic variation between such alternatives.  It merely 
suffices that such alternatives exist, provided that the chosen 
alternative is not a stock element of the work’s genre.  Despite 
these strictures, a court enjoys more flexibility in applying the 
abstractions test than would a computer applying a mechanistic 
algorithm.  A court’s definition of a work’s idea—and the 
associated alternatives that flow from that definition—is subject 
to no clear point of demarcation.  By selecting higher levels of 
abstraction to define the “idea,” a court will find a greater 
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number of works copyrightable to a greater degree; by selecting 
a more specific idea, fewer works will merit protection in lesser 
measure.  It is this flexibility that moves the abstractions test 
towards a Bergsonian conception of copyrightable creativity.  If 
the test does take a few steps in this direction by virtue of its 
flexibility in defining an idea, it does not seem to capture 
adequately the indeterminacy of the creative process or work.  
The artistic movement completely outside the abstractions 
framework is much more akin to the Southco dicta—a space of 
less defined “complex and indeterminate ideas.” 
A proposed use of Bergson’s theories as a paradigm for 
copyrightable creativity is not above certain criticisms.  
Philosophy might generally seem insufficient when applied to a 
space where a certain degree of scientific research has taken 
place.  Bergson would reply to this by pointing out that science 
and philosophy are ever in contact along a certain boundary, and 
stand to gain much from each other.  This seems all the more 
true in a space as fluid as creativity, where the challenges of 
brain science meet the ephemera of language and the 
vicissitudes of esthetics.  Another line of attack might question 
the utility of applying a somewhat deconstructive philosophy to 
a something as theoretically structured as the law.  What is 
proposed here, however, is not an application of Bergson’s 
thought to contracts, evidence, or civil procedure.  Those (and 
many other) areas of the law would clearly suffer from undue 
reliance on indeterminacy.  But not so for creativity, whose 
inherently changing nature and deep subjectivity fit quite well 
within any number of strictly philosophical views.  Creativity, 
even in the law, cannot be a site of rigid structure, lest the term 
fail to fit its real meaning.  It is just such a failure that the 
abstractions-based test commits.  Perhaps a more philosophical 
view can restore the term its proper place and meaning, or more 
accurately, its proper places and its multiple meanings—from 
fits and starts to evolution and complexity. 
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